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Resisting the Buck-Passing Account
of Value
Pekka Va¨yrynen
1. Introduct ion
T. M. Scanlon’s ‘‘buck-passing account’’ of value continues a long tradition
of analyzing value in terms of non-evaluative normative notions.1 Buck-
passers about value hold (speaking roughly for now) that to be valuable is
nothing more or other than to have other properties that provide reasons for
certain positive responses—namely, certain ‘‘pro-attitudes’’ and/or actions
expressive of them—to the bearers of those properties. This is to pass the
normative ‘‘buck’’ from value onto other properties: the reasons to favor
valuable things are provided not by their value but by the properties that
make them valuable (Scanlon, 1998: 97). To illustrate, as the prospects
of reaching Mordor turn bleak and Frodo Baggins’s spirit falters, Samwise
Gamgee tries to lift Frodo’s mood with an evaluative claim: ‘‘There’s
some good in this world, and it’s worth fighting for.’’2 According to the
format of analysis favored by buck-passers, the fact that something is worth
fighting for would just be the fact that it has other properties that provide
I presented an earlier version as ‘‘The Buck-Passing Account of Value (Almost)
Refuted’’ at the 2004 Wisconsin Metaethics Workshop and the Practical Reason and
Moral Motivation meeting in Rome. (Sometimes the direction of progress with work-in-
progress is towards wimpier titles.) I am grateful to these audiences for helpful discussion,
and to Russ Shafer-Landau for organizing a wonderful workshop. Many thanks to Jonas
Olson, Philip Stratton-Lake, Jussi Suikkanen, and an anonymous referee for comments
on earlier drafts which led to numerous improvements. I am indebted to Christian Coons
for very helpful conversations during the early stages of the paper.
1 Scanlon introduces the buck-passing account of value in his (1998: 95–8). Other
recent proponents of the view include Parfit (2001), Suikkanen (2004), and Stratton-
Lake and Hooker (2006). Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004) provide a useful
overview of the tradition Scanlon continues.
2 The line is from the movie The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers.
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reasons to fight for it. In this paper, I first clarify my target by addressing
questions about buck-passers’ format of value analysis, and about its scope
in particular. I then build a resistance front to the buck-passing account of
value by raising problems for its various forms.
2. What is a Buck-Pass ing Account of Value?
The basic idea of buck-passing is easy to grasp, but presentations of the
view leave it unclear what exactly the view is supposed to be. I begin by
clarifying my target on buck-passers’ behalf. As we’ll see, the buck-passing
account comes in many forms which we must address separately.
Scanlon introduces his view by considering the relations between prop-
erties that ‘‘can be grounds for concluding that [something] is valuable. . .
the property of being valuable, and the reasons that we have for behaving
in certain ways in regard to things that are valuable’’:
There seem to be two possibilities. The first is [Moore’s view] that when something
has the right natural properties it has the further property of being valuable, and
that property gives us reason to behave or react in certain ways with regard to it. . .
[Contrary to Moore, I believe] that being good, or valuable, is not a property that
itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or
valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons. . . . [T]his account
takes goodness and value to be. . . the purely formal, higher-order properties of
having some lower-order properties that provide reasons of the relevant kind. . . .
[I]t is not goodness or value itself that provide reasons but rather other properties
that do so. For this reason I call it a buck-passing account. (Scanlon, 1998: 97)
Here Scanlon advances two theses about value, one negative and the other
positive:
(BP−) Being good, or valuable, isn’t itself a reason-providing prop-
erty. The fact that an object o is good, or valuable, isn’t itself
a reason to respond to o in certain favorable ways.3
(BP+) Being good, or valuable, just is the purely formal, higher-order
property of having other property or properties P that provide
reasons to respond to things having P in certain favorable
ways.
3 I understand ‘object’ broadly to include any type of value-bearer. Facts or true
propositions are better candidates than properties for things that have the property being
a reason. So when Scanlon writes of properties as being what provide reasons, I take him
to mean that for a property P to provide a reason to (say) favor o is for the fact that o has
P to be (i.e. to have the property of being) a reason to favor o. It is important that the
reasons be practical: a thing needn’t be valuable merely if there are reasons to investigate
or reflect on its properties.
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The reasons in question are justifying practical reasons. Scanlon (like many
others) paraphrases ‘a reason’ for something as ‘‘a consideration that counts
in favor of it’’ (1998: 17). He seems to assume that if a thing’s having a
certain property makes it valuable, thereby giving a reason why it is of value,
then that property provides a reason for certain favorable responses to it.4
Buck-passing is meant to provide a formal account of value, so it should
be silent on which properties provide reasons; intuitive candidates include
pleasure, health, and knowledge.5 Whichever these properties are, what
matters is that their instances have the property of being reasons.6 Scanlon
leaves it unclear which pro-attitudes constitute the relevant favorable
responses, but he notes that they ‘‘generally include, as a common core,
reasons for admiring the thing and for respecting it’’ (1998: 95).
Buck-passers often present (BP−) as essential to their view, apparently
because they assume that (BP−) follows from (BP+).7 Scanlon also appears
to assume that (BP+) and the negation of (BP−)—that is, the view
that goodness is a reason-providing property, which Scanlon (correctly or
not) attributes to G. E. Moore—exhaust the options. But each of these
assumptions is mistaken. Buck-passers should define their view just in terms
of its positive thesis.
Take the first assumption first. Given (BP+), the fact that an object o is
valuable amounts to the following higher-order fact:
(HOF) o has properties (other than being valuable) which provide
reasons to respond to o in certain favorable ways.
Substituting (HOF) for the fact that o is valuable, (BP−) says that (HOF)
doesn’t itself constitute a reason to respond to o in the relevant favorable
ways. That claim doesn’t follow from (BP+) alone. We can agree that
(HOF) neither gives any additional reason to favor o beyond the reasons
provided by the properties that make o valuable nor is what ultimately
provides the reason to favor o instead of the properties that make o valuable.
But what if I know (perhaps by testimony) that something has properties
4 See Scanlon (1998: 97) and Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006: 153). I’ll grant this
assumption, but we should note that the relation of making something valuable is distinct
from the relation of providing a reason to respond to it in a certain way (cf. Dancy, 2004:
79–80). The former relates (tokens of) value properties to (tokens of) other properties,
the latter relates (tokens of) those other properties to attitudes and/or actions.
5 This is the sense in which pleasure, health, knowledge, and so on, are sometimes
said to be ‘‘values’’.
6 Whether their instances must be reasons always, or only in certain circumstances,
depends on such further issues in the theory of reasons as whether some form of holism
about reasons is correct (see s. 4 below).
7 See e.g. Scanlon (1998: 97), Parfit (2001: 19–20), and Stratton-Lake and Hooker
(2006: 149).
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that provide reasons to favor it, without knowing what those properties are?
One option is to say that (HOF) is a reason to believe that there is a reason
to favor o but is not itself a reason to favor o. Another is to say that (HOF)
serves as a derivative reason to favor o which is accounted for by other facts
about o. The latter idea would be that (HOF) states the sort of thing that
can be a reason for action: in the circumstances in question, acting in the
light of (HOF) would qualify as acting for a reason, and acting for a reason
requires acting on the basis of the sort of thing that can be a reason for
action. 8 Since (BP+) is completely silent on which of these views is correct,
(BP−) doesn’t follow from (BP+) alone (unless it is revised to say that being
valuable isn’t among the properties that ultimately provide reasons).
(BP+) and the view which (BP−) negates also don’t exhaust the options.
One of Scanlon’s arguments for the buck-passing account is an argument
from intuitions about reasons:
[W]hen I consider particular cases it seems that the [reasons to choose, prefer,
recommend, and admire things that are valuable] are provided by the natural
properties that make a thing good or valuable. So, for example, the fact that a resort
is pleasant is a reason to visit it or to recommend it to a friend, and the fact that a
discovery casts light on the causes of cancer is a reason to applaud it and to support
further research of that kind. . . . It is not clear what further work could be done by
special reason-providing properties of goodness and value, and even less clear how
these properties could provide reasons. (Scanlon, 1998: 97)
Notice that it is perfectly coherent (i) to accept Scanlon’s intuition about
which sort of properties (ultimately) provide reasons, (ii) to accept that
whenever something is valuable, it has the higher-order property of having
other properties that provide reasons, but (iii) to hold that this higher-order
property is distinct from the property of being valuable. Since Scanlon’s
argument fails to eliminate any such view, it fails as an argument for (BP+)
even if it succeeds as an argument for (BP−). 9
Buck-passers about value should define their view just in terms of their
positive thesis, then. But a number of issues remain about how (BP+)
8 I am indebted to Michael Smith for making this point in conversation.
9 This criticism of the argument is essentially Dancy’s (2000: 164–5), with inessential
simplifications and minor modifications. Scanlon’s other argument for (BP+) is ‘‘the fact
that many different things can be said to be good or to be valuable, and the grounds
for these judgments vary widely. There does not seem to be a single, reason-providing
property that is common to all these cases’’ (1998: 97–8). Stratton-Lake and Hooker
(2006: 156–7) show that this argument fails as well. It assumes the plurality of the good
whereas both the buck-passing account and its rivals are neutral as between pluralism
and monism. If hedonism, for example, were the correct substantive axiology, then the
buck-passing account would also imply that all instances of value have in common a
single ultimate reason-providing property.
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should be understood. To begin, is the thesis meant to be metaphysical or
conceptual? Buck-passers tend to go back and forth between describing their
view as a doctrine about facts and properties and describing it at the level of
language or concepts.10 But the possibility of defining evaluative concepts
in terms of the concept of a reason is consistent with rejecting much of
what buck-passers say in their metaphysical mode. Defining one concept
in terms of another doesn’t always settle the direction of metaphysical
priority between what the two concepts are concepts of. Hence I’ll take
buck-passers’ core thesis to be that reasons are metaphysically prior to value,
in that the property of being valuable isn’t metaphysically independent
but is analyzable in terms of the property of having reason-providing
properties.11
The downside of construing buck-passers’ core thesis as a metaphys-
ical claim is that buck-passers tell us very little about how they think
of properties.12 The issue matters. One way to defend (BP+) would be
to argue that the property of being valuable is necessarily co-extensive
with the sort of higher-order property that figures in (BP+) and then
appeal to the necessary co-extension test for property-identity: for any
properties A and B, if A is necessarily co-extensive with B, then A and
B are the same property. Scanlon himself cannot appeal to this argu-
ment for (BP+). He denies that we can identify the property of being
valuable with any non-normative property (1998: 96). But it is possible
to construct a (possibly infinite disjunctive) property expressed in purely
descriptive terms, which is necessarily co-extensive with the property of
being valuable (Jackson, 1998: 118–25). Given how sets are individuated,
the identity of necessarily co-extensive properties is difficult to avoid if
we think of a property as the set of all its actual and possible instances
(Lewis, 1999). Thus, if buck-passers accept this conception of proper-
ties, they’ll have difficulty avoiding the conclusion that the property of
being valuable and the property of being reason-providing are identical
to properties expressible in purely descriptive terms.13 Since buck-passers
10 Scanlon speaks of the view indiscriminately in metaphysical terms and as the
conceptual claim that ‘‘to call something valuable is to say that it has other properties
that provide reasons for behaving in certain ways with regard to it’’ (Scanlon, 1998: 96).
Suikkanen (2004) and Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006) are similarly undisciplined.
11 In my usage of ‘analysis’, analysis is a specification of properties rather than concepts
(see e.g. King, 1998).
12 The buck-passing account allows for deflationary or minimalist conceptions of
normative properties. It is also neutral between cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts
of normative judgment.
13 I doubt we can understand buck-passers’ use of the term ‘property’ as purely
pleonastic: as taking every meaningful predicate to express a property and two predicates
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don’t tell us how they think of properties, I’ll bracket the issue and
ignore arguments for (BP+) premised on the necessary co-extension test for
property-identity.14
Recent arguments that (BP+), as it stands, is an extensionally inadequate
statement of buck-passers’ positive thesis are also relevant to interpreting
the view. These arguments offer cases where we appear to have reasons to
respond favorably to things that aren’t valuable. To illustrate this ‘‘wrong
kind of reasons’’ problem, imagine that an evil demon is determined to
punish me unless I admire him for his determination to punish me. I have a
good reason to admire the demon’s determination for its own sake, namely
that I’ll avoid severe pain if I do so, but clearly the reason I have to admire
his determination is of a wrong kind to make it valuable.15 Here I grant
that buck-passers can restrict their positive thesis (in some appropriately
formal way) to all and only the right kind of reasons.16 The standard view
of higher-order properties is that they are generated by quantification over
some set B of lower-order ‘‘base’’ properties plus a condition on members
of B (Kim, 1998: 19–20). In those terms, I grant that there is some
extensionally adequate and appropriately formal specification of condition
R in the following restatement of (BP+):
(BP+′) Being good, or valuable, just is the property of having some
property P in B such that R(P), where R specifies a condition
on members of B which is satisfied just by those properties in
B that provide the right kind of reasons to respond to their
bearers in certain favorable ways.
to express different properties if they are non-synonymous. In the pleonastic sense,
the property of being valuable is distinct from the property of having other properties
that provide reasons, unless (implausibly) ‘is valuable’ is synonymous with ‘has other
properties that provide reasons’.
14 Buck-passers will eventually need to deal with the nature of properties. Suppose
e.g. that hedonism turns out to be the correct substantive axiology, so that being
valuable and being pleasant are necessarily co-extensive, but that buck-passers are right
that being valuable doesn’t (ultimately) provide reasons. In that event, nor could the
property of being pleasant provide reasons, unless either properties, no matter how they
are individuated, provide reasons only under certain descriptions, or else properties are
individuated more finely than by necessary equivalence.
15 Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004) discuss examples like this in great
detail.
16 For recent attempts, see e.g. Olson (2004) and Stratton-Lake (2005). An adequate
solution should also address certain technical issues about how to formulate the buck-
passing account. For example, if something is the lesser of two bads, it has a property that
provides a reason to prefer it to the greater bad. Since the lesser bad might still be quite
bad, it cannot have positive value simply because it has properties that provide reasons
to prefer it. I ignore the issue because it should be possible to state the buck-passing
account so as to handle betterness and worseness.
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In what follows, I’ll take the refinement as understood; below we’ll see
another purpose it serves.
One test for the plausibility of identifying goodness with the higher-
order property in (BP+′) is whether the latter property would fill the
goodness role in the mature evaluative practice of the folk (Jackson and
Pettit 1995). Since we don’t know how the mature folk valuations will
construe the goodness role, confidence that the ‘‘role property’’—that is,
the higher-order property of having the property that plays the goodness
role—will be the higher-order property in (BP+′) would be premature.
Notice, for example, that although the supervenience of value properties on
non-evaluative properties partly specifies the goodness role, (BP+′) doesn’t
entail that practical reasons are ultimately provided only by non-evaluative
properties. A further specification of the goodness role might be that
something is valuable only if a subject would desire it if she satisfied all
rational requirements and other ideals of reason. This, too, fails to support
the buck-passing account, since not all rational requirements (for example,
those of instrumental rationality) are analyzable in terms of a suitable
sensitivity to reasons.17
The attractive assumption that value is normative is silent as well on
whether the higher-order property in (BP+′) is what fills the goodness role.
For value to be normative is for it to make a difference to what one ought
or has reason to do. If something is valuable, it merits certain favorable
attitudes and there are reasons (at least for suitably situated agents) to adopt
those attitudes.18 I’ll assume that value is intimately tied to pro-attitudes
and reasons in this way. (BP+′) explains that intimate tie by reducing value
to reasons for the relevant attitudes. But the intimate tie is amenable to
other explanations. It might be that something is good when it merits
certain favorable attitudes, or when it has properties that provide reasons
17 See e.g. Broome (2002) and Smith (forthcoming).
18 The qualification in parentheses hides more than the idea that a reason must always
be assigned to an agent who is in a position to act on it. It might turn out further
that an agent has a reason only when she satisfies some ‘‘internalist’’ or other subjective
condition on justifying reasons. Such conditions raise complications that I have no
space to discuss, such as whether the buck-passing account would imply a corresponding
subjective condition on value, and whether such a condition would be plausible. In this
connection, I should also mention a related structural problem to which buck-passers
have yet to give a convincing reply (pace Suikkanen, 2004: 531–3). The problem is
Dancy’s polyadicity objection. Something can be good (or bad) without a specification
of the agent, whereas reasons always belong to agents; reasons don’t hang around waiting
to be assigned to agents. Therefore, no matter how many argument-places goodness has,
it is less polyadic than reasons are. But if reasons are polyadic to degree n, then the
higher-order property of having other properties that provide reasons is also polyadic to
degree n. Therefore that higher-order property is more polyadic than goodness, in which
case the two properties must be distinct. See Dancy (2000: 170).
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to respond favorably to it, and yet that goodness isn’t reducible to either
of these things. Perhaps, for example, we have reasons to have certain
attitudes to valuable things because those attitudes are appropriate to the
value of the things in question. In that case, value would be something
more fundamental that explains the reasons. Again, we cannot assume that
specifying the goodness role generates an argument for the buck-passing
account of value.
My focal question about buck-passers’ positive thesis concerns its scope:
to just which value properties is the buck-passing account of value supposed
to apply? Buck-passers tend to speak only of being good, or valuable, but it
is natural to wonder why their basic format of analysis shouldn’t apply to
other value properties as well. For (BP+′) is just an instance of the following
general schema (where V is a value property variable and B a set of base
properties):
(BP*) Being V just is the purely formal, higher-order property of
having some property P in B such that R(P), where R specifies
a condition on members of B which is satisfied just by those
properties in B that provide the right kind of reasons to
respond to their bearers in certain favorable ways.
In (BP*) the qualification ‘right kind’ is more than a placeholder for a
solution to the wrong kind of reasons problem. We need it to distinguish
distinct value properties from each other. As Scanlon notes, what attitudes
the reason-giving properties justify may be different in different cases (1998:
95). Different bearers of a particular value property may call for different
attitudes, as with elegance in philosophical argument, elegance in dress, and
elegance in chord change.19 More importantly, instances of different value
properties are often to be valued by means of different attitudes, as with
being admirable and being trustworthy. Unless the right kind of reasons
are those that bear specifically on whether something has a particular value
property, there may be distinct value properties for which (BP*) yields the
same analysans. Not all value properties, however, bear the kind of analytic
connection to the relevant responses which would make it straightforward
to analyze, for example, trustworthiness as possession of properties that
provide reasons for trust.
To cash out this aspect of the qualification without the circularity in
saying that instances of a value property call for those attitudes that are
appropriate to their value, buck-passers might apply (BP*) in the light of our
pre-theoretical views about what responses different value properties call
19 Indeed, different responses may be apt to an elegant chord change in a jazz tune
and in a punk rock song.
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for (see Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2004: 402). So understood,
(BP*) generates a recipe for analyzing different value properties at least
partly in terms of the different pro-attitudes which we have reasons to adopt
towards their bearers.20 But which value properties?
Applying (BP*) to different sets of value properties generates different
forms of the buck-passing account. But, almost without fail, presentations
of the view don’t specify the intended scope of (BP*). Since (BP*) itself is
so schematic that it is hard to know how to argue for or against it, we need
to proceed by assessing more concrete forms of the view. One fruitful way
to divide the options is to note that buck-passing may be either all-out or
only partial. That is to say, relative to a view of what properties count as
value properties in the first place, either every value property is the sort of
purely formal higher-order property we find in (BP*), or only some are.21
For example, suppose we hold the permissive view that being intrinsically
valuable, being morally valuable and being prudentially valuable (and the
like), being kind and being generous (and the like), being elegant and being
delicate (and the like), and being admirable and being desirable (and the
like) all count as value properties in our normative sense. Then all-out
buck-passing would hold that every single one of these value properties
is the kind of higher-order property we find in (BP*). Different forms of
partial buck-passing would restrict the scope of (BP*) only to different
proper subsets of these value properties, and treat the rest as some more
substantive sort of value properties.
In what follows, I proceed from the premise that the buck-passing account
is either partial or all-out in its scope. The scope of the buck-passing account
then depends on whether we can draw the kind of distinction among value
properties which the truth of partial buck-passing requires, and how we
draw it. Section 3 argues that the extant forms of partial buck-passing fail to
draw such a distinction; hence they don’t succeed in restricting themselves
only to some proper subset of value properties. Section 4 builds a cumulative
case for resisting all-out buck-passing. Section 5 criticizes a further positive
argument for buck-passers’ approach to value and offers brief concluding
remarks.
20 Nozick (1981: 429–30) provides a whopping 40-item list of ways of responding
to value. As Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004: 416) note, the relevant pro-
attitudes may have to have a complex intentional content: they may have to consist in
favoring an object, in one way or another, on account of some of its properties.
21 The relativity of the distinction to a set of value properties introduces the
complication that materially one and the same view of the scope of (BP*) may be partial
relative to one view of what counts as a value property but all-out relative to another.
This makes the distinction less neat, but needn’t diminish its heuristic value.
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3. Res i s t ing Part ia l Buck-Pass ing
Most buck-passers advance some form of partial buck-passing. While partial
buck-passers rarely make the intended scope of their views explicit, their
writings nonetheless contain a few suggestions as to how to restrict the
scope of (BP*) only to some proper subset of value properties. I’ll argue
that, in each case, the form of partial buck-passing in question is unstable.
We have seen that buck-passers tend to talk only of the property of being
good, or valuable, in stating their view. A literal interpretation is that (BP*)
applies only to a property of being valuable which all and only valuable
things have in common, in addition to whatever other value properties
they may have—whether they are valuable intrinsically or extrinsically, for
their own sakes or instrumentally, whether they are morally or aesthetically
valuable, whether they are kind or courageous, or admirable or desirable,
and so on.22 In constructing an analysis of such a wholly generic value
property, we must keep in mind that different types of valuable things may
be valuable in different ways, in that they may call for different pro-attitudes.
Letting B be a set of base properties and W range over pro-attitudes, the
proposal must be something like this:
(GBP) For any valuable object x, for x to be of value just is for x to
have some property P in B such that, for some way of valuing
W which x calls for, x’s being P is a reason to respond to x
in way W .
My objection to (GBP) relies on an assumption about properties which is
plausible in the present context: instances of a property should exhibit some
substantial commonality. We don’t think that a wholly heterogeneous set
of things as such makes a difference to what one ought or has reason to
do. If (GBP) is to be an adequate analysis of a normative property, the
condition it imposes on P should determine a class of ways of valuing that
exhibit a substantial commonality. For (GBP) implies that there may be
nothing more to being of value than the relevant similarities among the
different attitudes with which we have reason to respond to different types
22 Here I’ll let pass the point that I myself find such a wholly generic property of
being valuable obscure, for I find it hard to see what substantive commonality all and
only the things that are valuable in all these very different ways are supposed to share.
The point is akin to Judith Thomson’s line on generic goodness (2003 and elsewhere).
To be clear, my view is that, whatever Thomson’s own intentions may be, her arguments
truly target only the claim that there is such a thing as generic goodness, and not the
claim that there are such properties as being intrinsically good or being valuable for its
own sake. For we can treat the latter as ways of being good.
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of valuable things. Those things may have nothing else in common, since to
provide a reason is always to provide a reason for particular responses. The
objection is that there may not be enough similarities to go around among
the different ways of responding to valuable things for them to exhibit any
substantial commonality. If so, the condition in (GBP) determines only a
heterogeneous set of things.
One way to advance this objection is to argue that no sufficiently def-
inite account may be available of what distinguishes positive responses
(‘‘pro-attitudes’’) from the negative ones (‘‘con-attitudes’’), and both from
responses that are neither. The most promising way to draw these dis-
tinctions is based on the idea that pro-attitudes and con-attitudes are
distinguished from attitudes that are neither by their involving some con-
ative element and are distinguished from one another by the nature of the
conative elements they involve.23 If all pro-attitudes essentially involved a
favorable conative element, (GBP) would determine a substantive conative
commonality. But it seems that I can respect or appreciate various valuable
things without being moved by them. I can understand that some operas
have properties that provide reasons to respect them and various activities
involving them, and yet not be irrational or pathological if they fail to
engage me conatively. I can admire the way in which a jazz solo moves back
to the root chord as neat or nifty, and in that sense appreciate its aesthetic
value on the basis of my knowledge of the conventions of jazz, while being
unmoved by jazz. Examples like these suggest that there is no guarantee that
all pro-attitudes share a common conative core that distinguishes them from
con-attitudes.24 (The problem extends to separating pro- and con-attitudes
as a class from the class of responses that are neither.) Thus we cannot
assume that the condition on P in (GBP) determines a set of things with a
substantial conative commonality.25
23 Here I follow Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004: 401).
24 Since my point here concerns attitudes, it doesn’t seem to presuppose motiva-
tional externalism about reasons-judgments. But if you suspect that it does, note that
motivational reasons-judgment externalism may be plausible even if motivational ought-
judgment externalism isn’t. The judgment that a consideration is normatively relevant
in the way that reasons are may sometimes lack the kind of deliberative relevance which
motivationally efficacious considerations have. Ought-judgments, by contrast, may well
carry greater deliberative relevance.
25 If the different responses that we have reasons to adopt towards different valuable
things lack a common core that would make for a substantial commonality among all and
only the valuable things, then (GBP) makes the generic notion of value indefinite. The
indefiniteness doesn’t result from ordinary phenomena such as the existence of borderline
cases in the application of our evaluative language. Rather, (GBP) requires us to assume
(controversially, to say the least) that properties themselves can be metaphysically
indefinite. A fully generic notion of value may be indefinite in another way as well: many
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Analyses can certainly be surprising. The analysans in (GBP) has much
more structure to it, however, than one would have thought the analysan-
dum even covertly to possess. Because of this, (GBP) seems more plausible as
an analysans of the property of being valuable in a given particular way than
of a wholly generic value property. Perhaps the property of being admirable,
for example, is analyzable as possession of properties that provide reasons
to admire their bearers. If that is the best way to read buck-passers’ talk of
‘‘being good, or valuable,’’ then what they offer us is a recipe for analyzing
particular ways of being valuable: each way of being valuable is to be
analyzed as possession of properties that provide (the right kind of) reasons
to respond in certain specified ways W . This would broaden the scope of
(BP*) so much that it would border on all-out buck-passing. In any case, it
won’t do for partial buck-passers to restrict themselves merely to (GBP).
The obvious alternative for partial buck-passers is to find some distinction
that classifies kinds of value property in a way that explains why only some
kinds of value property are the sort of purely formal higher-order property
we find in (BP*) whereas others are some more substantive kind of value
properties. In fact, the writings of buck-passers point to at least two kinds
of distinctions among value properties which might do the job. I’ll discuss
these in turn.
Buck-passers tend to present their view by contrasting it with the view
that goodness is a reason-providing property, which they (correctly or not)
attribute to Moore. Moore shares the tendency to speak of ‘‘goodness’’ and
‘‘value,’’ but this is clearly sloppy on his part, as his real concern is with
intrinsic value. Insofar as buck-passers mean to contrast their view with the
view they take to be Moore’s, they should claim that the property of being
intrinsically valuable is analyzable as an instance of (BP*).26 Assuming
that intrinsic value is value that something has solely in virtue of its
intrinsic properties, buck-passers would presumably analyze it as possession
of intrinsic properties that provide reasons. But buck-passers’ own examples
preclude the restriction of (BP*) solely to intrinsic value. Scanlon’s example
of a holiday resort is relevant only if a pleasant resort has some type of value,
but whatever type of value it has is presumably not intrinsic.
understand the talk of being valuable as shorthand for the talk of being valuable in some
particular way. If asked which things are of value, many of us seek to identify whichever
things we identify on the basis of the varied responses we think they merit, not on the
basis of some substantive commonality. Of course, this does nothing to enhance the
interest of a fully generic notion of value to value analysis.
26 Curiously, Scanlon often qualifies ‘good’ and ‘valuable’ with ‘intrinsically’ in the
discussion that precedes his presentation of the buck-passing account (1998: 88, 90–2),
but drops the qualification when presenting it.
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We can understand the value of a pleasant resort in one of two ways. A
pleasant resort might have final value: it might be valuable for its own sake.
(Final value is distinct from intrinsic value: an object might be valuable for
its own sake partly in virtue of its being rare, but being rare isn’t an intrinsic
property.) More plausibly, a pleasant resort might have instrumental value:
it might be valuable for the sake of something else. Perhaps the causal
and constitutive relations it bears to other things make it conducive to
something that is valuable for its own sake, such as pleasurable experiences.
Whichever account we adopt of the value of a pleasant resort, we analyze
its value in terms of final value, since being instrumentally valuable is
analyzable in terms of being finally valuable.27 Thus, if (BP*) is true of
instrumental value, it must be true of final value as well.28 One motivation
to apply (BP*) to final value is that final value has a clear connection to
practical reason. Thus one form of partial buck-passing restricts (BP*) to
final value, and perhaps intrinsic value, plus any other value properties that
are analyzable in terms of those two.29
Restricting the buck-passing account to final value suffers from essentially
the same problem as (GBP).30 A reason to favor something for its own sake
may be either instrumental or non-instrumental.31 Thus the buck-passing
account of final value should be something like (FBP):
(FBP) For any object x, for x to be of final value just is for x to have
some property P in the base set B such that, for some way of
27 To some, Scanlon’s example of a good resort might suggest that (BP*) applies to
what Ross (1930: 65–7) calls ‘‘attributive goodness’’. This is the property of being good
of a kind, of satisfying the standards of excellence in a kind. Buck-passers shouldn’t apply
(BP*) to attributive goodness because being good of a kind isn’t necessarily connected
to reasons. Consider the property of being a good assassin: for persons to satisfy the
standards of excellence in assassinating isn’t necessarily for them to have properties that
provide reasons to respond favorably to them.
28 Whether (BP*) is to be applied to instrumental value depends on the controversial
issue whether instrumental value is itself a form of value at all, instead of something
merely conducive to value. Another notion that seems analyzable in terms of final value
is that of being ‘‘contributively good’’, that is, being such as to contribute to the final
value of the whole of which it is a part (cf. Ross, 1930: 72). Whether (BP*) is to be
applied to ‘‘contributive value’’ depends on the controversial issue whether contributive
value is itself a form of value, rather than merely a relation to value (see n. 49). In this
respect, contributive value is analogous to instrumental value.
29 As Jonas Olson pointed out to me, the idea that buck-passing is primarily a view
about final value is probably the traditional idea (see e.g. Ewing, 1947: 146).
30 The parallel objection can be run against forms of partial buck-passing that restrict
(BP*) to intrinsic value.
31 For discussion, see Stratton-Lake (2005) whose solution to the wrong kind of
reasons problem exploits this point.
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valuing W which x calls for, x’s being P is a non-instrumental
reason to respond to x in way W for its own sake.
To see why (FBP) doesn’t support restricting (BP*) to final value (and
whatever other value properties are analyzable in its terms), notice that
pretty much any attitude that is a possible value for W in (FBP) is one that
we may have reason to hold for a thing’s own sake in some cases but for the
sake of something else in others. For example, some things are admirable for
their own sakes but others are admirable only for the sake of something else.
According to (FBP), they are finally valuable only if they have properties
that provide non-instrumental reasons to admire them. These instances of
admiration aren’t different in kind. Indeed, your attitude of admiration is
no different in kind if you admire people’s keeping their promises but not
because you think of promise-keeping as valuable in any way. What then
distinguishes the responses that pertain to value from those that don’t?
These observations show not that (FBP) is mistaken as such, but that it
does little if anything to specify a particular class of different pro-attitudes
that we may have non-instrumental reason to adopt to different kinds of
things. This is a problem for forms of partial buck-passing built upon (FBP)
because if (as argued above) the different pro-attitudes lack a common
substantial core, then so do the pro-attitudes quantified over in (FBP).
Reasoning that parallels our objection to (GBP) then shows that to apply
(BP*) only to final value (and whatever value properties are analyzable
in its terms) is merely to apply selectively a general recipe for analyzing
different ways of being valuable. If so, (FBP) gives partial buck-passers
no independent grounds for restricting (BP*) merely to final value, and
the general recipe itself again broadens the scope of (BP*) so much that
it borders on all-out buck-passing. An adequate restriction of (BP*) only
to some subset of value properties requires some other type of distinction
among value properties.
One distinction that we might take to explain why only some kinds of value
property are the sort of higher-order property we find in (BP*) appears in
Scanlon’s response to a tension between his presentation of the buck-passing
account and his account of practical reflection on reasons. In discussing the
buck-passing account in What we Owe to Each Other, Scanlon claims that
reasons are typically provided by the natural properties of things rather than
their goodness or value (1998: 97).32 But he also suggests that judgments
about reasons involve a distinctively ‘‘evaluative element’’ (1998: 38), that
32 Thanks to Philip Stratton-Lake for reminding me that Scanlon doesn’t adhere to
the claim throughout What we Owe to Each Other. He claims (although he probably
shouldn’t) that the property of being wrong is reason-providing, but doesn’t regard it
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often one’s most important reason for doing what would satisfy a desire one
has is that it would be worthwhile or honorable (1998: 49), and that the
task of practical reflection on reasons is to characterize the concrete forms
of value that can be achieved in action (1998: 65–9). Jay Wallace takes this
tension to indicate that Scanlon’s real concern is with ‘‘the relation between
general and specific concepts’’ (2002: 447). He reinterprets the buck-passing
account as claiming that general evaluative claims can be ‘‘understood as
ways of signaling that there is some specific reason for action in the offing,
a reason that can be characterized by specifying the particular way in which
the action in question would be valuable’’ (Wallace, 2002: 448). Scanlon
endorses this reinterpretation: ‘‘My thesis was that goodness is not itself
a property that provides reasons, not that the underlying properties that
do this are always natural properties. . . more specific evaluative properties
often play this role’’ (Scanlon 2002: 513).33
One form of partial buck-passing then restricts (BP*) to ‘‘general’’
as opposed to ‘‘more specific’’ value properties. Wallace’s comment on
Scanlon’s example of a pleasant resort illustrates the view:
To say that a resort is ‘‘pleasant,’’ for instance, is a way of adverting to the
distinctively positive qualities of experience that are enjoyed by a visitor to the
resort. It is not merely an evaluatively neutral description of the natural properties of
the resort or of the experiences induced by the resort in its visitors, and this is what
makes it appropriate to think of pleasure itself as a concrete category of evaluation.
(Wallace, 2002: 448)
Wallace doesn’t say what he means by ‘advert’, but he assumes that pleasure
is a form of value that provides reasons.34 It is, however, unclear what
makes a value property count as specific or general. (If general value
properties are meant to be such properties as being of final value, the view
faces the problems discussed above.) The illustration is partly to blame.
Being pleasant, like being conducive to pleasant experiences, is a singularly
as a natural property (Scanlon, 1998: 10–12, 147–8). For a discussion of the relation
between buck-passing about value and buck-passing about rightness, see e.g. Dancy
(2000: 165–7).
33 Of course, for reasons given in s. 2, I think that the emphasis Scanlon places here
on (BP−) is misleading.
34 On one reading, what Wallace means by ‘advert’ is that to call something pleasant
is to recommend it, perhaps in the sense of ascribing to it a positive value property.
But the fact that speakers can use a term to recommend shows neither that it is a
value term nor that its referent is a value property. A more plausible sense in which
calling something pleasant is a way of adverting to the presence of value is that one
pragmatically presupposes or implicates that it instantiates some positive value property,
without implying that being pleasant is itself a value property. This happens if e.g. we
operate with the substantive but cancellable assumption that pleasure is good.
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bad example of a specific value property. Schadenfreude and the pleasant
experiences that activities such as sadism and genocide induce in some
people give us no reason to respond to those activities or experiences
favorably (at least, not as parts of these wholes). If so, being pleasant
isn’t necessarily connected to reasons in the way that buck-passers suppose
value to be. It is less plausible to regard being pleasant as a value property
than as a property that can make its bearers better (or worse, depending
on the context).35 But the distinction between specific and general value
properties is meant to distinguish among properties to instantiate which is
to be valuable (in a particular way), and we cannot do that by appealing
to properties that make their bearers valuable. The illustration fails to
appreciate the distinction between being valuable and making something
valuable.
Even if we found better examples of specific value properties, the
distinction between general and more specific value properties would have
the wrong kind of structure to restrict (BP*) only to some value properties.
Whatever the distinction is supposed to be (and this remains unclear),
generality and specificity are relative and gradable notions: one thing (say,
beneficence) can be general relative to another (such as kindness) and yet
specific relative to a third (such as virtue), and relative generality comes in
degrees. As such, the generality/specificity distinction tells us nothing as to
where, on the continuum of relative generality vs. specificity, an ascription
of a value property is supposed to be an ascription of the sort of purely
formal higher-order property we find in (BP*) rather than an ascription
of some more substantive value property. The problem, of course, is that
the distinction marks only a difference in degree among value properties,
whereas any form of partial buck-passing requires a difference in kind
between purely formal higher-order value properties and substantive value
properties. Hence the generality/specificity distinction as such gives us no
grounds not to apply (BP*) throughout the continuum if we apply it
anywhere.36 Any plausible restrictions on the scope of (BP*) must have
some other source.
35 We can interpret Wallace’s occasional talk of ‘‘particular forms’’ and ‘‘concrete
modalities’’ of value accordingly.
36 There are other distinctions which partial buck-passers might deploy in lieu of
the generality/specificity distinction. For example, one might try passing the buck from
properties that mark the genus ‘value’ onto its species, or from determinable value
properties onto their determinates. Both options face the problem of where to draw the
line between purely formal and substantive value properties. For example, a property
can be a determinable relative to one property but a determinate relative to another:
consider being red, being scarlet, and being colored. And species of value may themselves
be genera that include more specific value properties. Even if we drew the line by
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A different distinction to which partial buck-passers might appeal in this
neighborhood is that there is an intuitive sense in which ‘‘thick’’ value
properties, such as kindness and generosity, are specific, whereas ‘‘thin’’
value properties, such as being of final value, are general. We might then
think that each thin value property is the sort of higher-order property we
find in (BP*) whereas thick value properties are some more substantive sort
of value properties that are eligible to provide reasons.37 But this proposal
faces a dilemma.
A familiar dispute about thick value properties is whether they can be
‘‘disentangled’’ into distinct non-evaluative and thin evaluative components.
Either they can or not. If they cannot, then they are eligible to provide
reasons (see below). If they can, then we can analyze, for example, the
property of being generous (as a property of persons) as a disposition to
act in certain (non-evaluatively specifiable) ways towards others, plus the
fact that this disposition has thin value. In that case buck-passers about
thin value deny that the property of being generous is eligible to provide
(ultimate) reasons and instead take the reason-giving property to be the
non-evaluative component of generosity (that is, the disposition to act in
certain ways towards others).38
On the one hand, then, if the disentanglement claim is true, the
normative buck continues onto the non-evaluative components of thick
value properties. I suspect this broadens the scope of (BP*) beyond thin
value properties. If a buck-passer offered just an account of the thin value
component of a thick property, not an account of the property as a
whole, the account would have trouble distinguishing different thick value
properties from each other. For example, it would have trouble accounting
for the differences between the responses for which, say, generosity, bravery,
and elegance call without appealing to our notions of generosity, bravery,
restricting (BP*) to those determinable value properties that don’t themselves fall under
any determinable, or those genus properties that don’t themselves fall under a genus of
value, these options would face the further problem that neither genus nor determinable
properties are, in general, purely formal higher-order properties. Determinables, such as
being shaped, mark genuine categories of difference, but not merely in virtue of their
determinates; the parallel point goes for genus properties, such as being a mammal.
In that case determinable and genus properties wouldn’t count as instances of (BP*)
simply in virtue of being determinables or of marking a genus. So, neither distinction is
structurally cut out to restrict (BP*) only to some proper subset of value properties.
37 Although the literature usually speaks of thick and thin evaluative terms or concepts,
I’ll discuss the property version of the distinction in order to maintain my focus on
metaphysical issues. Perhaps the thin/thick distinction is what Wallace and/or Scanlon
really have in mind, although if that is the case I wonder why they don’t just say so.
38 I owe this distinction between buck-passers’ options on thick properties to
Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006: 152).
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and elegance. The account would also be inadequate to the standard
characterization of thick value properties as those that satisfy evaluative
concepts whose applicability is both world-guided, in the sense of being
constrained by non-evaluative criteria, and action-guiding, in the sense of
indicating reasons for action.39 For it would be adequate only to the ‘‘action-
guiding’’ conjunct. It would be adequate to the ‘‘world-guided’’ conjunct
if it also told us what the properties quantified over in the relevant instance
of (BP*) are. (This would also help to distinguish different thick properties
from each other.) But an account that captures both conjuncts broadens
the scope of partial buck-passing from thin to thick value properties. For
it makes thick value properties merely higher-order properties (albeit not
purely formal ones). So, we have reason to think that if the disentanglement
claim is true, forms of partial buck-passing built on the thin/thick distinction
either are inadequate or border on all-out buck-passing.
On the other hand, if thick value properties cannot be disentangled
into distinct evaluative and non-evaluative components, then they are
eligible to play the reason-giving role. The normative buck won’t continue
onto a distinct non-evaluative component of a thick property, since the
property has no distinct non-evaluative component to play the reason-giving
role. This might seem like good news to partial buck-passing. Like the
generality/specificity distinction, however, the thin/thick distinction marks
only a difference in degree along a spectrum of value properties (Scheffler,
1987: 417–18), whereas partial buck-passing requires a difference in kind.
Were the disentanglement claim true, we might try holding the thin
value component constant and explaining differences in degree in terms of
differences in the specificity of the relevant non-evaluative components. But
if that isn’t an option, the thin/thick distinction will tell us nothing as to
where along the spectrum an ascription of a value property is supposed to
be an ascription of the sort of purely formal higher-order property we find
in (BP*) rather than an ascription of some more substantive value property.
Hence the distinction as such gives us no grounds to apply (BP*) anywhere
on the spectrum if we don’t apply it to thick value properties, and no
grounds not to apply it all across the spectrum if we apply it to thin value
properties. So, we have reason to think that forms of partial buck-passing
built on the thin/thick distinction border on all-out buck-passing.40
39 See e.g. Williams (1985: 129, 140) and Hurley (1989: 11–13).
40 If any thick value property has a distinct, self-standing non-evaluative component,
that component typically is plausibly not analytically distinct from the evaluative
component, but rather can be isolated only by substantive normative theorizing. This
would seem to be in tension with buck-passers’ claim to be advancing a formal account
of value which is compatible with any substantive normative and evaluative theory.
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So far I have argued that the forms of partial buck-passing surveyed above
are unstable. A further source of pressure towards all-out buck-passing is
that partial buck-passing cannot claim for itself a putative advantage of the
buck-passing approach to value. The attraction is ontological parsimony:
if value is analyzable in terms of reasons, what we might have regarded
as two separate normative categories are reducible only to one. As Derek
Parfit puts it, ‘‘in believing that certain aims are good, or worth achieving,
[buck-passers] are not committed to normative properties other than the
property of being reason-giving, or committed to normative truths other
than truths about reasons’’ (Parfit, 2001: 38). Since partial buck-passers
think that there are some substantive value properties, the argument from
ontological parsimony can seemingly support all-out buck-passing at best.
If the above forms of partial buck-passing are unstable, this might
be because value properties share some characteristics that explain their
instability. That would unify the case that partial buck-passing is unstable.
Some writers suggest that values have some kind of ‘‘unity’’ that distinguishes
them from other values and in virtue of which their components hang
together the way they do.41 If a unity were a structural feature of value
properties on many levels of generality, one would expect that either
all value properties are purely formal higher-order properties or (more
plausibly) none are.42 The idea that value properties involve a kind of
unity, in virtue of which they are structured as they are, is intriguing.
It could explain why certain, but not all, possible ways of organizing the
various aspects of value properties constitute distinct categories of evaluative
difference (Raz, 2003: 133). But as I cannot explicate such a unity to my
satisfaction, I rest my claim that partial buck-passing is unstable on my
41 See e.g. Raz (2003: 39) and Chang (2004: 16). I don’t claim that Raz or Chang
intend this suggestion to speak against the buck-passing account of value, although at
least Raz clearly rejects the buck-passing account.
42 Typical examples of values that putatively have a unity, such as philosophical talent
(Chang, 2004: 16–17), concern ‘‘values’’ in the presently irrelevant sense of properties
that make things have their value properties (see n. 5). But the idea that value properties
that combine certain constituting qualities without being simply reducible to them have
some kind of unity has some intuitive pull. Aristotelian eudaemonia is a possible example:
being eudaemoˆn collects together its various constituents, such as the virtues as well as
certain types of pleasures and honors, and organizes and balances them with respect to
each other in an evaluatively distinct way (see e.g. Stocker, 1990: 172). This mode of
organization is evaluatively distinct because how well different options satisfy the claims
of eudaemonia to be protected, aspired to, and so on, isn’t simply a matter of how well
they satisfy the claims of the constituents, considered merely as separate evaluatively
relevant dimensions. What it is even to count as eudaemonia is a matter of combining
the constituting qualities of eudaemonia in the right sort of way, the way exemplified by
an excellent life. Perhaps eudaemonia has, in this sense, a distinctive sort of unity of its
constituting qualities.
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grounds for thinking that the particular forms of partial buck-passing
discussed above are unstable. Since buck-passers usually take themselves to
be partial buck-passers, this result, though inconclusive, is important.
4. Res i s t ing Al l -Out Buck-Pass ing
All-out buck-passing strikes many people as incredible: what good reason
could we have for thinking that no value property ever is eligible to provide
reasons? One might wonder, though, whether this reaction implicitly begs
some crucial question. Here I offer a case for resisting all-out buck-passing
which isn’t subject to this worry: buck-passers advertise their approach
to value as metaethically neutral, but all-out buck-passing turns out to
require controversial metaethical assumptions and, in addition, to incur
troublesome explanatory debts. Giving an adequate defense of all-out buck-
passing therefore requires defending its metaethical commitments and
discharging its explanatory debts. The case for resisting all-out buck-passing
is the stronger the more demanding this task is.43
We have already seen all-out buck-passing to incur one controver-
sial metaethical commitment. It requires that each thick value property
be analyzable as a possession of two distinct properties—namely, a cer-
tain non-evaluative property that is reason-providing and a ‘‘thin’’ value
property—but this disentanglement claim is famously controversial.
While card-carrying buck-passers tend to be non-naturalists about norm-
ative and evaluative properties, they aren’t non-naturalists qua buck-passers.
The basic thrust of their approach to value is neutral between naturalism
and non-naturalism. But all-out buck-passing turns out to be incompat-
ible with certain sophisticated forms of evaluative naturalism. Consider,
for example, the form of naturalism according to which value properties
are clusters of mutually supporting physical, medical, psychological, and
social goods unified by homeostatic mechanisms (Boyd, 1988: 203–4; cf.
194–9, 216–17). No value property that is a homeostatic unity is plausibly
regarded as the sort of purely formal higher-order property we find in
(BP*). According to all-out buck-passing, the reasons connected to the
43 The fact, noted in s. 2, that the distinction between partial and all-out buck-passing
is relative to a conception of what properties count as value properties complicates matters.
Restrictive conceptions might count some forms of buck-passing that I construed above
as forms of partial buck-passing as forms of all-out buck-passing instead. Permissive
conceptions might make all-out buck-passing much more inclusive than its proponents
would be willing to grant. My case for resisting all-out buck-passing won’t be entirely
immune to these complications, but mostly my discussion will require only relatively
modest assumptions about what properties count as value properties.
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presence of any such property would apparently have to be provided by
the non-evaluative properties in the given cluster. We cannot identify the
higher-order property of having such properties with the value property
because the former leaves out part of the latter, namely the homeostatic
unity among the clustered properties.
In response, all-out buck-passers might try to include the relevant
homeostatic mechanisms among the reason-providing properties. Suppose
I have reason to engage in some co-operative effort. If a value property
just is a group of homeostatically clustered goods, the co-operative effort
must, if it is to be valuable, support and be supported by other goods, such
as friendship and recreation, via the psychological and social mechanisms
that contribute to the homeostasis. Apparently what provides me the reason
to engage in the effort would have to be either (i) that doing so will
tend to foster the realization of these goods and sustain the homeostatic
mechanisms on which their unity depends or (ii) that doing so will tend
to foster co-operation. Either way, all-out buck-passing is inconsistent with
homeostatic naturalism. Given the homeostatic naturalist conception of
value properties, (i) implies that, contrary to all-out buck-passing, the
reason I have is provided by a value property. Regarding (ii), suppose that
engaging in co-operative effort sometimes does but at other times doesn’t
tend to foster the realization of the goods in question and sustain the
homeostatic mechanisms on which their unity depends. If so, the tendency
of some activity to foster co-operation sometimes does, but sometimes
doesn’t, provide reasons to favor it. Given homeostatic naturalism, what
the effort fosters when there is reason to favor it is the instantiation of a
value property. But in that case we can explain the variability of reasons by
reference to value: something is a reason to φ in one case because φ-ing
fosters an instantiation of a value property but isn’t a reason to φ in another
case because φ-ing fails to do so. Of course, if a value property explains why
certain considerations have the property of being reasons, it cannot be the
sort of purely formal higher-order property we find in (BP*).
Let’s move on to the explanatory debts of all-out buck-passing.44 I
argued earlier that the trouble partial buck-passers have with finding
distinctions among value properties which would explain why only some
value properties should be the sort of purely formal higher-order property
we find in (BP*) generates internal pressure towards all-out buck-passing.
In order for the lack of such distinctions to favor, rather than count against,
all-out buck-passing, all value properties must in addition be shown to be
44 I actually think that all-out buck-passing incurs yet further controversial metaethical
commitments, but have no space to argue the point here.
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purely formal higher-order properties rather than some more substantive
sort of properties. I’ll argue that such a project has dubious prospects.
Consider generosity. We might analyze it in part as the disposition
to benefit others out of one’s own resources without being intrusive or
expecting esteem or compensation, and perhaps out of sympathy for their
ends. Given that being generous is a value property (to attribute it to
people surely is to evaluate them), what bestows the higher-order property
of having other properties that provide reasons for certain pro-attitudes
on this complex disposition? All-out buck-passers cannot say that the
disposition itself does so if we characterize it partly in evaluative terms like
‘benefit’. They should specify the goods with which, and the ends in pursuit
of which, a generous person is disposed to aid others in the specified kind
of way in non-evaluative terms. They might, for example, analyze being
generous as (a) having the disposition to desire or pursue for others, without
being intrusive or expecting esteem or compensation, those resources of
one’s own which one would desire or pursue for them if one cared for them
for their own sakes plus (b) the fact that having that disposition provides
reasons to take certain pro-attitudes to its bearers.45
Analyses of thick value properties along these lines incur serious explan-
atory debts. Why, for example, are the non-evaluative aspects of generosity
related as they are? The properties that make someone beneficent don’t
provide reasons for the attitudinal responses for which generosity calls when,
for example, she also intends to gain others’ esteem or expects compensation.
What explains why the presence of the latter properties makes this kind of
difference between reasons of generosity and reasons of beneficence? One
possible explanation is value-based. The way in which generosity organizes
its non-evaluative aspects gives it evaluative aspects that beneficence lacks,
for we take the two properties to bear differently on agents’ moral worth.
But then attitudes that are appropriate to generosity are not appropriate
to the evaluative nature of esteem-seeking beneficence. But if it is because
of the distinctive evaluative nature of generosity that its bearers have the
higher-order property of having properties that provide the relevant reasons,
generosity is distinct from that higher-order property. All-out buck-passers
owe us an explanation that is superior to the explanation premised on the
assumption that generosity is a substantive value property.46
45 I intend (a) as a rough approximation of the buck-passing account of welfare
defended in Darwall (2002).
46 All-out buck-passers cannot discharge this explanatory debt simply by saying that
truths about reasons are the basic normative truths. The question of what explains the
difference in reasons is perfectly legitimate, and no less legitimate if the notion of a reason
for something, paraphrased as a consideration that counts in favor of it, is primitive
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All-out buck-passers might seek to undercut the explanation of reasons
in terms of value properties by trying to capture the differences between
generosity and beneficence in terms of reasons. The most promising strategy
seems to be to locate the differences in the reason-providing properties,
rather than in the attitudes. Perhaps, for example, the properties that
make something beneficent provide reasons to favor their bearers in ways
appropriate to beneficence without providing reasons to favor them in ways
appropriate to generosity when they are parts of ‘‘wholes’’ whose other
parts are properties such as intending to gain others’ esteem or expecting
compensation.47 If the ways in which a whole is valuable are determined
by its parts in some sense holistically, we might try to capture this evaluative
structure in terms of an analogous holism of reasons.48 One version of this
idea is that, even if the beneficence-making properties are pretty much the
same as the generosity-making properties, the other parts of a beneficent
whole may entail the absence of those background conditions (such as not
seeking esteem) which enable the properties that make it beneficent to
make it generous. Such a view would require some potentially controversial
claims about which properties of generous persons provide reasons for the
relevant attitudes and which amount merely to the necessary background
conditions for the properties in question to provide those reasons. But the
general project would be to emulate the structure of a value property in
terms of the conditions under which the base properties quantified over in
the relevant instance of (BP*) provide reasons for the attitudes for which
the bearers of the value property in question call.
I find this project problematic. Suppose a property which gives reasons
to respond to its bearer in a certain way does so only in the presence of some
(Scanlon, 1998: 17). Even if the notion of a reason is a conceptual primitive, it doesn’t
follow that there is no explanation of why a certain consideration has the property of
being a reason. Then it doesn’t follow that truths about what sort of differences in
the non-evaluative properties of things make what sort of differences to our reasons
are primitive truths. Moreover, the buck-passing account as such doesn’t entail that
truths about reasons are the basic normative truths, for it is consistent with the Humean
view that the reasons that agents have are grounded in their desires. Scanlon (1998:
41–9) rejects the Humean view because of his further claim that reasons are the most
basic normative elements of practical reason. Here I’ll ignore Humean buck-passers
about value.
47 Instead of ‘‘wholes’’ we might speak of objects and their context.
48 It might be that the value of a whole is determined by the values of its parts
‘‘organically’’, perhaps in the way Moore (1993: 79–81) thought, or that while the value
of a whole is some non-organic function of the values of its parts, the values of those parts
are contextually conditional (see Dancy, 2003; 2004: 176–84). In the latter case, the
relevant sort of holism of reasons would be roughly that of Dancy (2004: 73, 38–43);
in the former, it might be roughly that of Ross (1930: 19–20, 41–2). Unfortunately I
have no space here for a fuller discussion of these issues.
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conditions that enable it to give those reasons. Then the presence of such
an enabling condition will play a role in the sustenance of value, thereby
giving reason to preserve its presence. For were the condition not to obtain,
the property that gives the reason wouldn’t do so. If enabling conditions
involve properties that provide reasons, all-out buck-passers must either
regard them as valuable in some way or explain why these reasons don’t
ground value. The latter option faces the general problem of explaining why
some properties that give reasons, but not others, ground value. (Purely
deontological reasons to fulfill promises come to mind as another example
of the latter.) The former option faces the problem that it is more plausible
to treat the kind of ‘‘enabling value’’ in question as a relation to value
than a relational form of value. While a condition that itself has no value
cannot contribute value to an object, it may perfectly well play a vital
enabling role with respect to the object’s value.49 For example, when an
object has final value partly in virtue of being a unique instance of its kind,
the non-existence of other instances appears to be a valueless condition,
but one that enables the object to have final value.50 In sum, doctrines
about reasons with which buck-passers might seek to emulate the structure
of value properties have problematic consequences when conjoined with
all-out buck-passing.
Even if all-out buck-passers can defuse these worries, their task won’t
be finished. Finding doctrines about reasons which mirror the relevant
doctrines about value does nothing to settle the question of which are
explanatorily prior. All-out buck-passers must further show that the latter
doctrines are better explained by the former than vice versa. But the converse
direction of explanation is a strong contender. For example, the reasons that
enabling conditions provide in virtue of the role they play in the sustenance
of value is readily explained in terms of value and without a commitment
to regard enabling conditions as having any special relational form of value.
A related explanatory debt of all-out buck-passing is to explain how, for
any value property V , what distinguishes V from other value properties
is solely a function of the reasons in terms of which it analyzes V . As
we saw in section 2, buck-passers can avoid the circularity in saying that
49 There are related grounds to doubt that ‘‘contributive value’’ (recall n. 28) is a
distinct form of value. Philip Stratton-Lake writes: ‘‘For something to be contributively
valuable is for it to stand in a better-making relation to the whole of which it is a
part. Contributive value is, therefore, a relational form of value’’ (2002: 127). If a part
cannot contribute to a whole more value than it actually has as a part of that whole
(Dancy, 2003: 630–1), only what is otherwise valuable can be contributively valuable.
But this does nothing to show that contributive value is itself a relational form of value,
as opposed to a relation to value which it is possible only for valuable parts to instantiate.
50 For a different sort of example, and a fuller discussion, see Dancy (2003: 634–5).
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a value property calls for those attitudes that are appropriate to its value
by appealing to our pre-theoretical views about the attitudes for which
different value properties call. But this exposes them to the worry that our
pre-theoretical views might distinguish finely enough neither between the
responses for which closely related but distinct value properties call nor
between the properties that provide those reasons. If so, there might be
pairs of distinct value properties which are too similar in both respects for
either to distinguish the properties. Buck-passers owe us some systematic
account of why drawing the right distinctions won’t in fact be a problem.
The worry is pressing in the case of value properties that bear no analytic
connection to appropriate responses in the way that being admirable or
being trustworthy do. As we now conceive all-out buck-passers’ strategy,
what suffice to raise the worry are mere pre-theoretical possibilities to the
effect that two distinct value properties are associated with reasons that
are too similar to distinguish the properties. For example, it seems pre-
theoretically possible for the correct substantive theory of welfare to imply
that we should respond to welfare subjects as if they were friends, that is,
respond to them with the same kinds of attitudes, and on the same kinds of
grounds, as we respond to friends.51 (Such a theory wouldn’t imply that we
should make friends with welfare subjects.) Given a view that counts welfare
and friendship as value properties, the application of (BP*) to each would in
that event deliver the same higher-order property, when it shouldn’t. This
would be a reason not to identify either property with that higher-order
property.
The example presupposes that the pre-theoretical data about welfare and
friendship are consistent with the idea that we should respond to welfare
subjects as if they were friends. Pre-theoretically, however, the properties
that provide reasons of welfare and reasons of friendship do seem similar
enough not to distinguish the two properties. For example, insofar as we
think (as all-out buck-passers must) that the properties that provide these
reasons are non-evaluative, prominent among them are the needs, interests,
and desires of friends and welfare subjects. The relevant responses also
seem similar enough. Reasons of welfare and those of friendship are reasons
to respond to certain individuals, in whatever ways are appropriate, for
their own sakes, and it is pre-theoretically possible that the responses are
similar enough not to distinguish the two properties. Perhaps, in both
cases, the relevant responses are those characteristic of a loving concern.
In both cases, then, the relevant reason-providing properties and responses
51 I am indebted to Christian Coons for suggesting this possibility. Ruling it out with
a substantive conception of welfare would violate the spirit of all-out buck-passing as a
formal analysis of value.
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seem pre-theoretically similar enough not to distinguish between the purely
formal higher-order properties with which all-out buck-passers would
identify friendship and welfare.52 The worry appears to generalize.53
Towards the end of section 3, I noted that the argument from ontological
parsimony seems at most to support all-out buck-passing. As a form of
theoretical economy, parsimony is only a defeasible merit: greater parsimony
is preferable, but only insofar as all else is at least roughly equal. In this
section, I have in effect argued that the other things aren’t roughly equal
for all-out buck-passing. We have seen that all-out buck-passing requires
controversial metaethical assumptions, and that we may doubt whether
all-out buck-passers can do better than their opponents in discharging
certain explanatory debts concerning value properties and their relation to
reasons. Hence ontological parsimony fails, at least for now, to provide any
significant source of support for all-out buck-passing. Taken together, the
above worries about all-out buck-passing constitute a good cumulative case
for resisting it.
5 . Conclus ion
My resistance to the buck-passing account of value takes the form of a
dilemma. Proceeding from the assumption that any form of the account
is either all-out or partial in its scope, I first argued that the forms of
partial buck-passing I surveyed don’t succeed in restricting themselves only
to certain proper subsets of value properties, and then built a resistance
front to all-out buck-passing. Because buck-passers’ basic format of value
analysis is so schematic that it can be wielded in a diverse array of ways,
my argument strategy against buck-passers has been to spray a buckshot of
considerations against particular ways of wielding the format. In closing,
I’ll criticize a further positive argument for the buck-passing approach to
value and offer some tentative positive suggestions.
Suppose buck-passers’ opponents (a) accept that, whenever something
is valuable (in a particular way), it also has the sort of purely formal
52 Jussi Suikkanen suggested to me that it might be partly constitutive of friends’
concern for each other that they have together formed a view of each others’ needs,
interests, and desires on some shared basis. The same doesn’t seem true of an appropriate
concern for non-friend welfare subjects, even if we should respond to welfare subjects as
if they were friends. I think more needs to be said about how the suggestion is supposed
to distinguish friendship and welfare from one another, rather than merely to distinguish
the conditions for the presence of welfare-related and friendship-related reasons (which
reasons may pre-theoretically be very similar to each other).
53 Roger Crisp (2005: 82) has independently raised a very similar objection, using
grace and delicacy as his example.
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higher-order property we find in (BP*), but (b) regard this higher-order
property as distinct from the property of being valuable (in that way). Philip
Stratton-Lake and Brad Hooker argue that buck-passing is a better option
for those who agree with the negative thesis that the fact that something is
valuable never adds to the reasons provided by the properties that make it
valuable. This is because the opposition ‘‘leaves unexplained why goodness
cannot provide us with an additional reason,’’ whereas
the buck-passing account of goodness explains why the fact that something is good
never gives us a reason to care about it. On the buck-passing account, the fact that
something is good is the fact that it has other properties that provide reasons to care
about it, and the fact that it has such properties cannot provide an extra reason to
care about it. (Stratton-Lake and Hooker, 2006: 161)
Stratton-Lake and Hooker in effect claim an exclusive explanatory advantage
to buck-passing.
The argument needs refinement, however, given the different possible
scopes that (BP*) can take. Stratton-Lake and Hooker should claim that, for
any value property V to which (BP*) applies, only buck-passers can explain
why the fact that something is V never ultimately gives us reasons to respond
to it in those ways for which its being V calls. This claim has a narrower
appeal. If the disentanglement claim about thick value properties is false,
any thick property is a better candidate for the relevant reason-providing
property than the non-evaluative properties co-instantiated with it. Those
non-evaluative properties are better candidates only if the disentanglement
claim is true. But the opposition has resources to explain why thick value
properties would in that event never provide extra reasons to respond to
their instances in the relevant ways.
In discussing all-out buck-passing, I mentioned the view that we can
appeal to value properties to explain the reasons that are necessarily
connected to their instantiation. If the disentanglement claim about thick
value properties is true, such a view could explain why the non-evaluative
component of generosity (say) provides reasons for certain attitudes to
generous things by saying that adopting those attitudes on account of
the property in question is a response that is adequate to the way in
which those things are valuable. If something’s being generous provides
an explanatory reason why certain of its purely non-evaluative properties
give reasons for the attitudes in question, it is reasonable to suppose that
being generous (or other thick properties) never provides an extra practical
reason for those attitudes. For what could be the point of such double
duty? The value property would already have made its difference to what
we have reason to do. Since Stratton-Lake and Hooker’s argument ignores
accounts of this sort, it is persuasive only in conjunction with independent
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arguments against them. Such arguments would, of course, seem to make
theirs superfluous.
If we have good reasons to resist the buck-passing approach to value,
where should we look for an alternative account of the relation between
value and reasons? If value is necessarily connected to reasons but we cannot
adequately account for truths about value in terms of truths about reasons,
we should doubt that reasons are metaphysically primary. The intuitive
default position seems in any case to be that they aren’t. It is surely no
accident that some considerations but not others count as reasons. Often
we can explain why a consideration is a reason, and are unsatisfied if we
cannot. (The question why a consideration possesses the kind of normative
force that is characteristic of reasons is especially natural when its content is
non-normative.) We might not always be able to appeal to value properties
to explain why the properties that provide us with reasons for certain kinds
of responses do so. For we might think that there are deontological reasons
that have nothing to do with value. We could, however, try to construct
a general schema for explaining reasons which doesn’t apply exclusively to
value properties.
In many cases the explanation of why a consideration with non-normative
content is a reason might well go in terms of a value property. For example,
if a sculpture like Bernini’s The Ecstasy of St Theresa is sublime because of
the double-faceted facial expression it portrays, it would seem quite natural
to explain why this feature of the sculpture gives us reasons for certain
responses by describing its relation to aesthetic sublimity. To say this isn’t
to deny that the instantiation of the former property ontologically grounds
or realizes that of the latter. For that claim doesn’t settle the normative
question of why, when the latter property is a value property (or some
other kind of normative property), the instantiation of the former property
should have such relevance to the latter’s instantiation. The ontological
dependence of an instantiation of a value property on an instantiation of a
non-evaluative property is one thing. The normative dependence relation
in which an instance of the non-evaluative property stands to that on
which it depends for its having the property of being reason-giving (a
value property, perhaps) is different. Another illustration of this distinction
would be a form of welfarism about reasons which grants that instances
of the property of being good for a person are ontologically grounded in
certain non-evaluative properties and that all sorts of considerations besides
welfare might function as reasons, but holds that any consideration that
does function as a reason depends for its having the property of being a
reason on promotion of welfare. In other cases the explanation of reasons
might not proceed in terms of value. It might instead proceed in terms of
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deontological notions such as rights, fairness, or duty, or etiquettal notions,
and so on.
If an explanatory schema of this sort were generally applicable, it would
provide us with considerable explanatory gains. The resulting hypothesis
about the relation between reasons and value would accommodate the
negative insights that buck-passers emphasize. But it would avoid worries
about distinguishing reasons that give rise to value from reasons that
don’t, as well as the other worries I have raised about the buck-passing
account. Since I have said very little to develop or support this hypothesis,
however, it would be premature for me to endorse it. But the alternative
it constitutes to buck-passers’ positive approach to value seems worthy of
further consideration.
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